The task in this chapter is to examine the influence of international norms on the domestic structures of states. From a neorealist view, international norms are expected to lead towards homogeneity because of their content; that is to say, international norms express successful practices in a situation of competitive, systemic pressures. Therefore, the `socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement in the system' (Waltz 1979:128) . Liberals expect processes of modernization, including closer contact with the modern world, to have similar effect of homogenization in context of a process of modernization. Yet it was also indicated earlier that international norms might lead to heterogeneity because they removed the pressure for emulating the successful states. In the beginning of the twentieth century, prevailing international norms were explicated in a so-called `standard of civilization' which set forth the requirements for the acceptance of new members of the society of states. The content of that standard and its implications for domestic conditions in prospective new member states will be taken up first. I then turn to the situation after 1945. The development of what is now a set of rules of recognition is recorded and two types of cases are singled out for additional treatment. First, the treatment of the defeated powers, Germany and Japan, whose compliance with international norms was secured through internal restructuring. The second case concerns the peculiar new class of member states that emerged in international society through the relaxation of membership requirements made in context of decolonization. Both types of cases will demonstrate distinct combinations of the forces of homogeneity and the forces of heterogeneity.
The analysis of the effects of international norms will reinforce the conclusion from the previous chapter, that states cannot be considered across the board `like units'. For reasons explored below, states are only to a limited extent socialized to `sameness' due to their integration in international society. Furthermore, this chapter will suggest that there are distinctive patterns in the ways in which international norms have affected states in the postwar period. That is to say, the combinations of forces of homogeneity and heterogeneity emerge in typical modalities of sovereign statehood. International norms (in combination with political±military power analysed in the previous chapter and economic power analysed in the next chapter) have helped create three main types of state in the post-Second World War international system: modern, postmodern, and postcolonial states.
International norms and the society of states
International norms are standards of behaviour connected to the possession of sovereignty. Sovereignty is itself an institution, that is, `persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane 1990:732) . Sovereignty emerged in Europe between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries. It is common to connect the rise to European dominance of that institution with the peace of Westphalia in 1648.
1 For a long period, sovereignty and thus membership of the society of states was a privilege of European countries. Non-European areas were not considered qualified for membership; they lacked the necessary civilizational and religious (Christian) qualifications. The extension of European influence on a global scale was not undertaken primarily through diplomatic negotiation, but via coercion and control. In North and South America Spaniards and Portuguese, and later Frenchmen and Englishmen, colonized the `New World'. Indigenous civilizations were almost completely annihilated and a large number of slaves were imported from Africa. The natives of America never achieved sovereignty; that was bestowed on descendants of the European colonizers who took the lands into possession. To qualify for sovereignty the new rulers had to meet the standards set by Europe.
Some of the ancient civilizations in Asia were not subjected to colonization; instead, Europeans imposed unequal treaties in order to open up the areas for European economic and political interests. This is what happened in the case of China after the opium wars (1839±42). Europeans in Shanghai, for example, were not subject to Chinese authority. In its place, European jurisdiction was extended to include Europeans in China. Africa, by contrast, was colonized. The Europeans felt certain that they had a civilizational mission to undertake; according to Sir Frederick Lugard, `The African holds the position of a late-born child in the family of nations, and must as yet be schooled in the discipline of the nursery'; this was simply, according to M. F. Lindley, a part of the obligation that `the advanced peoples collectively owe to backward races in general' (both
